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Abstract
Given an election, a preferred candidate p, and a budget, the SHIFT BRIBERY problem
asks whether p can win the election after shifting p higher in some voters’ preference orders.
Of course, shifting comes at a price (depending on the voter and on the extent of the shift)
and one must not exceed the given budget. We study the (parameterized) computational com-
plexity of SHIFT BRIBERY for multiwinner voting rules where winning the election means to
be part of some winning committee. We focus on the well-established SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda,
and Chamberlin-Courant rules, as well as on approximate variants of the Chamberlin-Courant
rule, since the original rule is NP-hard to compute. We show that SHIFT BRIBERY tends to
be harder in the multiwinner setting than in the single-winner one by showing settings where
SHIFT BRIBERY is easy in the single-winner cases, but is hard (and hard to approximate) in the
multiwinner ones. Moreover, we show that the non-monotonicity of those rules which are based
on approximation algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant rule sometimes affects the complex-
ity of SHIFT BRIBERY.
1 Introduction
We study the computational complexity of campaign management—modeled as the SHIFT BRIBERY
problem—for the case of multiwinner elections. In the SHIFT BRIBERY problem we want to ensure
that our candidate is in a winning committee by convincing some of the voters—at a given price—
to rank him or her more favorably. In particular, this models campaigns based on direct meetings
∗An extended abstract of this paper appeared under the title “Complexity of shift bribery in committee elections” in
the Proceedings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI ’16), pages 2452–2458 [12].
†Most of the work was done while the author was affiliated with TU Berlin.
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with voters, in which the campaigner presents positive features of the candidate he or she works for
(see also the works of Cary [15], Magrino et al. [38], Xia [51], and Faliszewski at al. [28] for other
interpretations of bribery problems). While the complexity of campaign management is relatively
well-studied for single-winner elections [24], it has not been studied for the multiwinner setting yet
(there are, however, studies of manipulation and control for multiwinner elections [2, 43]).
The goal of a multiwinner election is to pick a committee of k candidates based on the pref-
erences of the voters. These k candidates might, for example, form the country’s next parliament,
be a group of people shortlisted for a job opening, or be a set of items a company offers to its cus-
tomers (see the overview of Faliszewski et al. [27] and the papers of Lu and Boutilier [37], Skowron
et al. [50], and Elkind et al. [22] for a varied description of applications of multiwinner voting).
Since the election results can affect the voters and the candidates quite significantly, we expect
that they will run campaigns to achieve the most desirable results: a person running for parliament
would want to promote her or his political platform; a job candidate would want to convince the HR
department of her or his qualities.
We study the standard, ordinal model of voting, where each voter ranks the candidates from the
one he or she likes best to the one he or she likes least. We focus on rules that are based either on the
Borda scores of the candidates or on their t-Approval scores. Briefly put, if we have m candidates,
then a voter gives Borda scorem− 1 to his or her most preferred candidate, scorem− 2 to the next
one, and so on; a voter gives t-Approval score 1 to each of his or her top-t candidates and score 0 to
the other ones.
The most basic multiwinner rules simply pick k candidates with the highest scores (for example,
SNTV uses 1-Approval scores, Bloc uses k-Approval scores, and k-Borda uses Borda scores). While
such rules may be good for shortlisting tasks, they do not seem to perform well for cases where the
committee needs to be varied (or represent the voters proportionally; see the overview of Faliszewski
et al. [27] and the work of Elkind et al. [22]). In this case, we may prefer other rules, such as those
in the Chamberlin-Courant family of rules [16], which try to ensure that every voter is represented
well by some member of the committee (see Section 2 for an exact definition), or the STV rule.
Unfortunately, while the winners of SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda rules are polynomial-time com-
putable, this is not the case for the Chamberlin-Courant rules (Procaccia et al. [46] and Lu and
Boutilier [37] showNP-hardness). We deal with this problem in two ways. First, there are exact FPT
algorithms for computing Chamberlin-Courant winners (for example, for the case of few voters).
Second, there are good polynomial-time approximation algorithms (due to Lu and Boutilier [37]
and Skowron et al. [49]). Following Caragiannis et al. [14] and Elkind et al. [22], we consider these
approximation algorithms as voting rules in their own right ( societies may use them in place of the
original, hard-to-compute ones).
The idea of the SHIFT BRIBERY problem is as follows. We are given an election and a preferred
candidate p, and we want to ensure that p is a winner (in our case, is a member of a winning
committee) by shifting him or her forward in some of the votes, at an appropriate cost, without
exceeding a given budget. The costs of shifting p correspond to investing resources into convincing
the voters that our candidate is of high quality. For example, if a company is choosing which of
its products to continue selling, the manager responsible for a given product may wish to prepare
a demonstration for the company’s higher management. Similarly, a person running for parliament
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would invest money into meetings with the voters, appropriate leaflets, and so on. Thus, we view
SHIFT BRIBERY as a model of (a type of) campaign management. Nonetheless, there are also other
appealing interpretations of the bribery problems. For example, Cary [15], Magrino et al. [38], and
Xia [51] studied the margin of victory problem (which is a form of destructive bribery), where the
goal is to ensure that a given candidate does not win by changing as few votes as possible. The fewer
votes need to be changed, the more likely it is that a given election was tampered with. Similarly,
Faliszewski et al. [28] suggested that the amount of bribery needed to ensure that a given candidate
wins is a good measure of how well this candidate performed in the election; the fewer changes in
the votes are necessary, the closer a given candidate was to victory (indeed, Faliszewski et al. [28]
argue that this measure might be more appealing than the candidates’ scores). This measure-of-
success interpretation applies to our work as well.
SHIFT BRIBERY was introduced by Elkind et al. [20, 21], and since then a number of other
researchers studied both SHIFT BRIBERY (e.g., Schlotter et al. [47], Bredereck et al. [10, 11], Kacz-
marczyk and Faliszewski [32] and Maushagen et al. [42]), and related campaign management prob-
lems (e.g., Dorn and Schlotter [18], Baumeister et al. [4], Faliszewski et al. [26], and Knop et
al. [34]). Naturally, the problem also resembles other bribery problems, such as the original bribery
problem of Faliszewski et al. [25] or those studied by Mattei et al. [41] and Mattei, Goldsmith, and
Klapper [40]. We point the reader to the overview of Faliszewski and Rothe [24] for more details
and references.
For single-winner elections, SHIFT BRIBERY is a relatively easy problem. Specifically, it is
polynomial-time solvable for the t-Approval rules. For the Borda rule, for which it isNP-hard, there
is a good polynomial-time approximation algorithm [20] and there are exact FPT algorithms [10].
In the multiwinner setting the situation is quite different. The main findings of our research are as
follows (see also Table 1 in Section 3):
1. The computational complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY for multiwinner rules strongly depends on
the setting. In general, for the cases of few candidates we find exact FPT algorithms while
for the cases where the preferred candidate is shifted by few positions only we find hardness
results (even though these cases are often easy in the single-winner setting).
2. The computational complexity for the case of few voters most strongly depends on the un-
derlying scoring rule. Generally, for the rules based on t-Approval scores the complexity of
SHIFT BRIBERY tends to be lower than for analogous rules based on Borda scores.
We did not study multiwinner rules such as the STV rule, the Monroe rule [44], or the rules for the
approval elections (see, e.g., the works of Brams and Kilgour [6], Aziz et al. [1, 2], and Lackner
and Skowron [35]), in order to keep our set of rules small, while being able to compare our results
to those for the single-winner setting (however, we mention that Maushagen et al. [42] considered
SHIFT BRIBERY for round-based rules, including STV, and Faliszewski et al. [28] considered prob-
lems analogous to SHIFT BRIBERY for the case of approval-based multiwinner rules).
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2 Preliminaries
Elections and Voting Rules. For each integer n, we set [n] := {1, . . . , n}. An election E =
(C, V ) consists of a set of candidates C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a collection of voters V = (v1, . . . , vn).
Each voter v is associated with a preference order, i.e., with a ranking of the candidates in decreasing
order of appreciation by the voter. For example, ifC = {c1, c2, c3}, then by writing v : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3
we mean that v likes c1 best, then c2, and then c3. We write posv(c) to denote the position of candi-
date c in voter v’s preference order (e.g., in the preceding example we would have posv(c1) = 1).
When we write a subset A ⊆ C of candidates in a description of a preference order, we mean listing
all members of A in some fixed, easily computable order. If we put
←−
A in a preference order, then
we mean listing members of A in the reverse of this fixed order.
Let E = (C, V ) be an election withm candidates and n voters. The Borda score of candidate c
in the vote of v, v ∈ V , is βv(c) = m − posv(c). The Borda score of c in the election E is
βE(c) =
∑
v∈V βv(c). The single-winner Borda rule elects the candidate with the highest Borda
score (if there are several such candidates, they tie as winners). For each t ∈ [m], we define the
t-Approval score as follows: for a candidate c and voter v, αtv(c) = 1 if v ranks c among the
top t positions and otherwise it is 0; we set αtE(c) =
∑
v∈V α
t
v(c). We define the single-winner
t-Approval rule analogously to the Borda rule.
A multiwinner voting rule R is a function that, given an election E = (C, V ) and an integer
k ∈ [|C|], outputs a set R(E, k) of k-element subsets of C . Each size-k subset of C is called a
committee and each member of R(E, k) is called a winning committee.
The most natural task that arises when considering (multiwinner) voting rules is the task of de-
ciding whether a given candidate is among the winners (resp. is part of some winning committee).
We will refer to this task as the WINNER DETERMINATION problem. Sometimes, winner deter-
mination procedures studied in the literature consider slightly different goals (e.g. computing the
score of a winning committee). However, all polynomial-time, FPT, and XP winner determination
procedures for the rules we study in this paper can be modified to solve WINNER DETERMINATION.
We consider the following rules (below, E = (C, V ) is an election and k is the committee size):
1. SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda compute the score of each candidate and output the committee of
k candidates with the highest scores (or all such committees, if there are several). SNTV and
Bloc use, respectively, 1-Approval and k-Approval scores, while k-Borda uses Borda scores.
For these rules winners can be computed in polynomial time.1
2. Under the Chamberlin-Courant rules (the CC rules), for a committee S, a candidate c ∈ S is
a representative of those voters that rank c highest among the members of S. The score of a
committee is the sum of the scores that the voters give to their representatives (highest-scoring
committees win); Borda-CC uses Borda scores, t-Approval-CC uses t-Approval scores. WIN-
NER DETERMINATION for CC rules is NP-hard [37, 46], but is in FPT when parameterized
by the number of voters or candidates [5].
1 There may be exponentially many winning committees, but it is easy to compute their score and to check for a subset
of candidates if it can be extended to a winning committee.
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3. Greedy-Borda-CC is a (1 − 1
e
)-approximation algorithm for the Borda-CC rule, due to Lu
and Boutilier [37]. (The approximation is in the sense that the score of the committee output
by the algorithm is at least a 1 − 1
e
fraction of the score of the winning committee under
Borda-CC.) The algorithm starts with an empty setW and executes k iterations, in each one
adding toW the candidate c that maximizes the Borda-CC score ofW ∪{c}.2 For example, it
always picks a Borda winner in the first iteration. Greedy-Borda-CC always outputs a unique
winning committee.
4. Greedy-Approval-CC works in the same way as Greedy-Borda-CC, but uses t-Approval scores
instead of Borda scores. It is a (1 − 1
e
)-approximation algorithm for t-Approval-CC. We re-
fer to t-Approval-Greedy-CC for t = ⌈m·w(k)
k
⌉ (where w is Lambert’s W function; w(k) is
O(log k)) as PTAS-CC; it is the main part of Skowron et al.’s [49] polynomial-time approxi-
mation scheme for Borda-CC.
Parameterized Complexity. In a parameterized problem, we declare some part of the input (e.g.,
the number of voters) as the parameter. A parameterized problem is fixed-parameter tractable (is
in FPT) if there is an algorithm that solves it in f(ρ) · |I|O(1) time, where |I| is the size of a given
instance encoding, ρ is the value of the parameter, and f is some computable function. There is a
hierarchy of classes of hard parameterized problems, FPT ⊆ W[1] ⊆ W[2] ⊆ · · · ⊆ XP. It is
widely believed that if a problem is hard for one of the W[·] classes, then it is not in FPT. The
notions of hardness and completeness for parameterized classes are defined through parameterized
reductions. For this paper, it suffices to use standard polynomial-time many-one reductions that
guarantee that the value of the parameter in the problem we reduce to exclusively depends on the
value of the parameter of the problem we reduce from.
If a parameterized problem can be solved in polynomial time under the assumption that the
parameter is constant, then we say that it is in XP. Recall that membership in FPT additionally
requires that the degree of the polynomial is a constant independent from the parameter. If a problem
is NP-hard even for some constant value of the parameter, then we say that it is para-NP-hard.
For details on parameterized complexity, we point to the books of Cygan et al. [17], Downey
and Fellows [19], Flum and Grohe [29], and Niedermeier [45].
3 Shift Bribery
Let R be a multiwinner rule. In the R-SHIFT BRIBERY problem we are given an election E =
(C, V ) with m candidates and n voters, a preferred candidate p, a committee size k, voter price
functions (see below), and an integer B, the budget. The goal is to ensure that p belongs to at
least one winning committee (according to the rule R),3 and to achieve this goal we are allowed to
shift p forward in the preference orders of the voters. However, each voter v has a price function
2If there is a tie between several candidates, then we assume that the algorithm breaks it according to a prespecified
order.
3Our approach is a natural extension of the non-unique winner model from the world of single-winner rules. Naturally,
one might alternatively require that p is a member of all winning committees or put an even more demanding goal that
would involve other candidates.
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πv : [m] → N, and if we shift p by i positions forward in the vote of v, then we have to pay πv(i).
We assume that the price functions are nondecreasing (i.e., it cannot cost less to shift our candidate
farther than to shift her or him nearer) and that the cost of not shifting p is zero (i.e., πv(0) = 0 for
each v). Bredereck et al. [10] have considered several different families of price functions. In this
paper we focus on two of them: unit price functions, where for each voter v it holds that πv(i) = i,
and all-or-nothing price functions, where for each voter v it holds that πv(i) = qv for each i > 0
(where qv is some voter-dependent value) and πv(0) = 0.
A shift action is a vector (s1, . . . , sn) of natural numbers that for each voter specify by how
many positions to shift p. If ~s = (s1, . . . , sn) is a shift action, then we write shift(E,~s) to denote
the election obtained from E by shifting p an appropriate number of positions forward in each vote.
If Π = (π1, . . . , πn) are the price functions of the n voters, then we write Π(~s) =
∑n
i=1 πi(si) to
denote the total cost of applying ~s. For a shift action ~s, we define #~s =
∑n
i=1 si and we call it the
number of unit shifts in ~s.
Formally, we define R-SHIFT BRIBERY as follows.
Definition 1. Let R be a multiwinner voting rule. An instance I of R-SHIFT BRIBERY consists
of an election E = (C, V ), a preferred candidate p ∈ C , a committee size k, a collection Π =
(π1, . . . , πn) of price functions for the voters, and an integer B, the budget. We ask whether there is
a shift action ~s = (s1, . . . , sn) such that:
1. Π(~s) ≤ B, and
2. there is a committeeW ∈ R(shift(E,~s), k) such that p ∈W .
We refer to such a shift action as a successful shift action; we write OPT(I) to denote the cost of
the least expensive successful shift action.
Following Bredereck et al. [10], we consider the most natural parameterizations by the number n
of the voters, by the number m of the candidates, and by the minimum number s of unit shifts
in a successful shift action. We summarize our results, as well as some previously known ones,
in Table 1. The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 4, we present findings
applying to the multiwinner context as a whole. In Section 5, we present specific results for the
voting rules SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda. In Section 6, we present our results for Chamberlin-Courant
rules and their approximate variants. We conclude in Section 7 with a discussion and an outlook.
4 General Results
We start our discussion by providing several results that either apply to whole classes of multiwinner
rules (including many of those that we focus on) or that are proven using general, easily adaptable
techniques. These results form a baseline for our research regarding specific rules.
First, we note that for each of the rules that we study, SHIFT BRIBERY with unit price func-
tions is in FPT when parameterized by the number of candidates. This result follows by applying
the standard technique of modeling the problem through an integer linear program and invoking
Lenstra’s theorem [36]. We conjecture that, using the MILP technique of Bredereck et al. [9], or
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voting rule R
R-WINNER R-SHIFT BRIBERY
DETERMINATION #candidates (m) #voters (n) #shifts (s)
si
n
g
le
w
in
n
er
t-Approval
P⋆
P▽
Borda FPT♦
FPT(0/1-pr.), FPT-AS♦,
FPT♦
andW[1]-h (Thm. 2)
m
u
lt
i
w
in
n
er
SNTV
P⋆
P (Prop. 6)
Bloc
k-Borda
FPT (Thm. 1)
FPT(0/1-pr.) (Prop. 2), W[1]-h (Thm. 3)
Borda-CC
NP-h♠, FPT-AS (Prop. 1), and
Para-NP-h♠FPT(n)♥, and W[1]-h (Cor. 1+Cor. 2)
Approval-CC FPT(m)♥
FPT (Prop. 3)Greedy-Approval-CC
P⋆ W[2]-h (Thm. 5)PTAS-CC
Greedy-Borda-CC W[1]-h (Cor. 2)
Table 1: Overview of our complexity results for the SHIFT BRIBERY problem (for reference, we
also mention the complexity of the WINNER DETERMINATION problem). The results in each cell
apply to all voting rules listed in the leftmost column which span the height of the cell. All results
are for the case of unit price functions, with the exceptions of those marked as FPT(0/1-pr.), which
are for all-or-nothing price functions (many other results extend to other price functions, but we
do not list them here). FPT-AS stands for FPT approximation scheme (see Proposition 1). Note
that all variants which are W[·]-hard are also in XP. Results marked by ▽ follow from the work of
Elkind et al. [21], by ♦ follow from the work of Bredereck et al. [10], by ♠ follow from the works
of Procaccia et al. [46] and Lu and Boutilier [37], by ♥ follow from the work of Betzler et al. [5],
and by⋆ are folklore results.
the more general toolbox of n-fold integer programming [31] (see the work of Knop et al. [34] for
an application of n-fold IPs regarding other bribery problems), it is also possible to generalize this
result to all-or-nothing price functions (or even to general price functions).
Note that the following theorem does not mention SNTV and Bloc since, as we will see in the
next section, for them the problem is even polynomial-time solvable.
Theorem 1. Parameterized by the number of candidates, SHIFT BRIBERY with unit prices is in
FPT for k-Borda, Approval-CC, Borda-CC, Greedy-Approval-CC, PTAS-CC, and Greedy-Borda-
CC.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we introduce an algorithmic scheme similar to that of Dorn and
Schlotter [18] for single-winner SWAP BRIBERY. We will make use of the fact that integer linear
programs (ILPs) can be solved in FPT time with respect to the number of (integer) variables (fol-
lowing a famous result by Lenstra [36] which was later improved by Kannan [33] and by Fredman
and Tarjan [30]). We first introduce the scheme and the basic ILP formulation. Then, we show how
to extend the ILP so that the algorithmic scheme works for k-Borda (by proving Lemma 1), for
Approval-CC and Borda-CC (by proving Lemma 2), and for Greedy-Approval-CC, PTAS-CC, and
Greedy-Borda-CC (by proving Lemma 3).
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The idea of the scheme is to guess the members of the winning committee W ⊆ C , |W | = k,
p ∈ W , and to verify the guess by solving an ILP. More precisely, we try all possible winning
committees in the outer loop of our algorithm and call the corresponding ILP for each of the (less
than 2m) potential winning committees that contain p. For the round-based rules (Greedy-Approval-
CC, PTAS-CC, and Greedy-Borda-CC) we furthermore guess a function w : [k] → W mapping
each “position” in the committee to a specific candidate fromW . This allows us to specify in which
round each member joined the committee according to the round-based rules and can be realized
with an additional factor of k! ≤ m! in the running time. For each j ∈ [k], letW j denote the set of
the first j members according to the function w, that is,W j = {w(j′) | 1 ≤ j′ ≤ j}.
There are m! different preference orders and, by ordering them arbitrarily, we can speak of the
i-th preference order for each i ∈ [m!]. Below we describe the main components of our ILPs.
For each i ∈ [m!] and j ∈ [m!], we introduce an integer variable Si,j which represents the
number of voters who originally have the i-th preference order, but who will have the j-th one after
the bribery. We add the following constraints for each i ∈ [m!], ensuring that each original vote is
turned into exactly one bribed vote (by ni we mean the number of voters who, prior to the bribery,
have the i-th preference order): ∑
j∈[m!]
Si,j = ni.
Then, we add the following constraint, ensuring that the cost of our bribery action does not ex-
ceed the budget B (by cost(i, j) we mean the number of unit shifts necessary to transform the i-th
preference order into the j-th one, or B + 1 if such a transformation is impossible):
∑
i∈[m!],j∈[m!]
Si,j · cost(i, j) ≤ B.
For each j ∈ [m!], we introduce an integer variable Nj which represents the number of voters who
have the j-th preference order after the bribery. To ensure that these variable have the correct values,
for each j ∈ [m!] we introduce the following constraint:
Nj =
∑
i∈[m!]
Si,j.
This describes the basic ILP which will be extended in the proofs of the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Parameterized by the numberm of candidates, k-Borda SHIFT BRIBERY is in FPT.
Proof. To ensure that p is a member of the k-Borda winning committee, we have to guarantee that
only the other members of the winning committee may have larger Borda scores than p. Hence, for
each candidate c /∈W , we add the following constraint to the base ILP (by βi(c) we mean the Borda
score that candidate c receives in the i-th preference order):
∑
i∈[m!]
Ni · βi(p) ≥
∑
i∈[m!]
Ni · βi(c).
This finishes the description of the extended ILP.
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Lemma 2. Parameterized by the numberm of candidates, both Approval-CC SHIFT BRIBERY and
Borda-CC SHIFT BRIBERY are in FPT.
Proof. To ensure that p is a member of the Approval-CC (respectively, Borda-CC) winning com-
mittee W , we have to guarantee that no other committee has a larger Approval score (respectively,
Borda score) than our guessed committee W . Hence, for each other committee W ′, we add the
following constraint to the base ILP, ensuring that in the bribed election, the score ofW (based on
the Ni variables) is at least as high as the score ofW
′ (by φ(i,X) we mean the score assigned by a
voter with the i-th preference order to committee X):
∑
i∈[m!]
φ(i,W ) ·Ni ≥
∑
i∈[m!]
φ(i,W ′) ·Ni.
Note that the values φ(i,W ) and φ(i,W ′) can be precomputed in polynomial time and are constants
from the point of view of the ILP. This finishes the description of the extended ILP.
Lemma 3. Parameterized by the number m of candidates, SHIFT BRIBERY is in FPT for Greedy-
Approval-CC, PTAS-CC, and Greedy-Borda-CC.
Proof. Since PTAS-CC is a special case of Greedy-Approval-CC, it suffices to describe the exten-
sion of the ILP for Greedy-Approval-CC and for Greedy-Borda-CC.
To ensure that p is a member of the winning committee W for Greedy-Approval-CC (respec-
tively, Greedy-Borda-CC), we have to guarantee that the candidate w(j) (which joins the committee
in the j-th round) maximizes the score of the committee, among all the candidates that can be added
in the j-th round. Hence, for each round j and each c ∈ C \W j , we add the following constraint to
the basic ILP, ensuring that in the bribed election, the score ofW j is at least as large as the score of
W j−1 ∪ {c} (as in the previous lemma, by φ(i,X) we mean the score assigned by a voter with the
i-th preference order to committee X):
∑
i∈[m!]
φ(i,W j) ·Ni ≥
∑
i∈[m!]
φ(i,W j−1 ∪ {c}) ·Ni.
This finishes the description of the extended ILP.
The proofs of Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3 complete the proof of Theorem 1.
As the second general result, we note that for the parameterization by the number of voters we
can provide a strong, general FPT approximation scheme for candidate-monotone rules. Candidate
monotonicity, a notion introduced by Elkind et al. [23], requires that if a member of a winning com-
mittee is shifted forward in some vote, then this candidate still belongs to some (possibly different)
winning committee.
Proposition 1. Consider parameterization by the number of voters. LetR be a candidate-monotone
multiwinner rule with an FPT algorithm for WINNER DETERMINATION. Then, for every positive
constant number ε there is an FPT algorithm that, given an instance I of R-SHIFT BRIBERY (for
arbitrary price functions), outputs a successful shift action ~s with cost at most (1 + ε)OPT(I).
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Proof. Bredereck et al. [10] show an FPT algorithm (parameterized by the number of voters) that,
given an instance I of SHIFT BRIBERY and a positive value ε, for each possible shift action ~s =
(s1, . . . , sn) tries a shift action ~s
′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
n) such that for each i ∈ [n] we have s
′
i ≥ si, and
the cost of ~s′ is at most (1 + ε) greater than that of ~s. This algorithm also works for multiwinner
rules.
Among the rules considered in this work, only Greedy-Borda-CC, Greedy-Approval-CC, and
PTAS-CC are not candidate-monotone (see the work of Elkind et al. [23] for the argument regarding
Greedy-Borda-CC). Thus, the above result applies to all remaining rules.
For the case of all-or-nothing prices, we can strengthen the above result to an exact FPT algo-
rithm.
Proposition 2. Consider parameterization by the number of voters. Let R be a
candidate-monotone multiwinner rule with an FPT algorithm for WINNER DETERMINATION.
Then, there is an FPT algorithm for R-SHIFT BRIBERY with all-or-nothing price functions.
Proof. Since R is candidate-monotone and we have all-or-nothing prices, for every vote where we
shift the candidate p forward, we can shift p to the top. In effect, it suffices to try all subsets of
voters: For each subset check whether shifting p forward in each vote from the subset ensures the
victory of p without exceeding the budget.
Using a very similar approach, we can solve SHIFT BRIBERY for those of our rules which are
based on approval scores, even for arbitrary price functions (even the round-based ones). The trick
is that, with approval scores, for each voter we either shift our candidate right to the lowest approved
position or we do not shift him or her at all. Thus, again, trying all subsets of voters suffices.
Proposition 3. There is an FPT algorithm for SHIFT BRIBERY under Approval-CC, Greedy-
Approval-CC, and PTAS-CC, for the parameterization by the number of voters and for arbitrary
price functions.
Finally, using smart brute-force, we provide XP algorithms for SHIFT BRIBERY parameterized
either by the number of voters or the number of unit shifts (for rules that can be efficiently computed
in the given setting).
Proposition 4. Consider parameterization by the number of voters. Then, for every multiwinner
rule with an XP algorithm for WINNER DETERMINATION, there is an XP algorithm for SHIFT
BRIBERY and arbitrary price functions.
Proof. For each voter, we guess the amount which the preferred candidate is shifted by. Since the
maximum amount is m, and we have n voters, we have O(mn) possibilities to check. For each
possibility we check if the preferred candidate is a member of a winning committee in XP time.
Proposition 5. Consider parameterization by the number of unit shifts. Then, for every multiwinner
rule with a polynomial-time algorithm for WINNER DETERMINATION, there is an XP algorithm
for SHIFT BRIBERY and arbitrary price functions.
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Proof. The idea of the proof is similar to that behind Proposition 4. Let s be the number of unit
shifts that we can perform and let n be the number of voters. We can view a solution as a vector of
length at most s, where an entry in the i-th position is the name of the voter on whose preference
order we apply the i-th unit shift. We try all O(ns) such vectors and for each we test if the shift
action it defines is within the budget and ensures that the preferred candidate is in the winning
committee.
5 SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda
We now move on to results specific to the voting rules SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda. These rules pick
k candidates with the highest 1-Approval, k-Approval, and Borda scores, respectively, and, so, one
might suspect that the efficient algorithms for corresponding single-winner rules would translate to
the multiwinner setting. While this is the case for SNTV and Bloc, for k-Borda the situation is more
intricate. As a side effect of our research, we resolve the complexity of Borda-SHIFT BRIBERY
parametrized by the number of voters, which was left open by Bredereck et al. [8].4
We first show that SHIFT BRIBERY is polynomial-time solvable for SNTV and Bloc. Briefly put,
the idea is to guess the final score of the preferred candidate and to compute the set of candidates
that have higher scores. Then, given committee size k, it is easy to compute the cheapest way to
ensure that all but k − 1 of these candidates have smaller score than the guessed score of p, while
ensuring that p indeed obtains this guessed score. We rely on the fact that under both rules and for
each vote it suffices to consider only one possible shift action, either shifting the preferred candidate
to the top of the vote (for the case of SNTV) or shifting the preferred candidate to the first approved
position (for the case of Bloc).
Proposition 6. SNTV-SHIFT BRIBERY and Bloc-SHIFT BRIBERY are both polynomial-time solv-
able (for arbitrary price functions).
Proof. We use the same algorithm for both SNTV and Bloc. Consider an input instance I with an
election E = (C, V ), where p is the preferred candidate, and where the committee size is k. Our
algorithm proceeds as follows.
As first step, we guess the final score that p would have after a successful bribery, denoted by
endscore(p). Since there are only polynomially many possibilities, we can simply branch over all
possible values of endscore(p) to implement the first step. Then, we consider the set C ′ ⊆ C of
those candidates whose scores are greater than endscore(p). It is clear that to ensure that p is in
some winning committee, we need to decrease the score of all but k − 1 candidates from C ′. If C ′
contains at most k − 1 candidates, then we do not need to decrease the scores of any candidates.
To this end, we sort the candidates in C ′ by the cost of decreasing their score (by appropriate
shifts of p) to be equal to endscore(p), and pick all of the candidates in C ′, besides the k − 1 most
expensive ones. Since for each bribed voter one can decrease the score of exactly one candidate,
this defines a shift action. If this shift action does not guarantee that p has score endscore(p), then
4In fact, the long version [10] of Bredereck et al. [8] refers to the short version of this work [12] as resolving this open
question.
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we complement it by shifting p to the lowest approved position in sufficiently many cheapest votes,
to ensure that p has score endscore(p).
If the thus computed shift action is within budget, then we accept. Otherwise, we try another
guess of endscore(p). If we try all possibilities without accepting, then we reject.
The situation for k-Borda is different. Elkind et al. [21] have shown that SHIFT BRIBERY is
NP-hard for Borda and, so, the same holds for k-Borda. We show that Borda-SHIFT BRIBERY is
W[1]-hard for parameterization by the number of voters, resolving a previously open case [8].4 This
immediately implies the same hardness results for all our Borda-based rules.
Theorem 2. Parameterized by the number of voters, Borda SHIFT BRIBERY isW[1]-hard (even for
unit price functions).
Proof. We give a parameterized reduction from the W[1]-hard MULTICOLORED INDEPENDENT
SET problem. Given a graph G = (V (G), E(G)) where each vertex has one of h colors, MULTI-
COLORED INDEPENDENT SET asks whether there are h vertices of pairwise-distinct colors such
that no two of them are connected by an edge. Let (G,h) be our input instance. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that the number of vertices of each color is the same and that there are no edges
between vertices of the same color. We write V (G) to denote the set of G’s vertices, and E(G) to
denote the set of G’s edges. Further, for every color i ∈ [h], we write V (i) = {v
(i)
1 , . . . , v
(i)
q } to
denote the set of vertices of color i. For each vertex v, we write E(v) to denote the set of edges
incident to v. For each vertex v, we write δ(v) to denote its degree, i.e., δ(v) = |E(v)| and we let
∆ = maxu∈V (G) δ(u) be the highest degree of a vertex G.
We form an instance of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY as follows. We let the candidate set be:
C = {p} ∪ V (G) ∪ E(G) ∪ F (G) ∪D′ ∪D′′,
where F (G), D′, and D′′ are sets of special dummy candidates. For each vertex v, we let F (v)
be a set of ∆ − δ(v) dummy candidates, and we let F (G) =
⋃
v∈V (G) F (v). We set F (−i) :=⋃
v∈V (i
′),i′ 6=i F (v). We will specify D
′ and D′′ later. For each vertex v, we define the partial prefer-
ence order S(v):
S(v) : v ≻ E(v) ≻ F (v).
For each color i, we define R(i) to be a partial preference order that ranks first all members of D′,
then all vertex candidates of colors other than i, then all edge candidates corresponding to edges
that are not incident to a vertex of color i, then all dummy vertices from F (−i), and finally all
candidates from D′′.
We use unit price functions and we set the budget to beB = h(q+(q−1)∆). We setD′ andD′′
to consist of 2B dummy candidates each. We create the following voters:
1. For each color i ∈ [h], we introduce four voters, xi, x
′
i, yi, and y
′
i. Voters xi and x
′
i have the
following preference orders:
xi : S(v
(i)
1 ) ≻ S(v
(i)
2 ) ≻ · · · ≻ S(v
(i)
q ) ≻ p ≻ R(i),
x′i :
←−−−−
S(v(i)q ) ≻
←−−−−−
S(v
(i)
q−1) ≻ · · · ≻
←−−−−
S(v
(i)
1 ) ≻ p ≻ R(i).
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Voters yi and y
′
i have preference orders that are reverses of those of xi and x
′
i, respectively,
except that candidates from D′′ are ranked last in their votes as well.
2. We create a voter z with the preference order:
z : F (G) ≻ V (G) ≻ E(G) ≻ D′ ≻ p ≻ D′′,
and a voter z′ with the preference order that is obtained from that of z by first reversing it,
and then shifting each member of V (G) ∪ E(G) by one position forward, and shifting p by
B positions back.
Let L be the score of p prior to executing any shift actions. Simple calculations show that each
candidate in V (G) ∪E(G) has score L+B + 1, and each candidate in F (G) ∪D′ ∪D′′ has score
at most L+B (to see this, it suffices to consider voters z and z′ as the other voters have preference
orders that are symmetric with respect to all the candidates except for those in D′′, who are always
ranked last).
We show that it is possible to ensure the victory of p in our election by a bribery of cost at
most B if and only if there is a multicolored independent set for G of size h.
For the “if” case, we show that ifG has a multicolored independent set, then there is a successful
shift action of cost B in our election. Let us fix a multicolored independent set for G and, for each
color i ∈ [h], let v
(i)
si be the vertex of color i from this set. For each pair of voters xi, x
′
i, we shift p
so that in xi he or she ends up right in front of v
(i)
si+1
(or p does not move if si = q), and in x
′
i he
or she ends up right in front of v
(i)
si . This way, p passes every vertex candidate from V
(i) and every
edge candidate from
(⋃
t∈[q]E(v
(i)
t )
)
\E(v
(i)
si ). This shift action costs B/h for every pair of voters
xi, x
′
i, so, in total, costs exactly B. Further, clearly, it ensures that p passes every vertex candidate
so each of them has score L + B. Finally, since we chose vertices from an independent set, every
edge candidate also has score at most L + B: If p does not pass some edge e between vertices of
colors i and j for a pair of voters xi, x
′
i, then p certainly passes e in the pair of votes xj , x
′
j because
visi and v
j
sj are not adjacent.
For the “only if” case, we show that if there is a successful shift action for our instance, then
there is a multicolored independent set for G. We note that a shift action of cost B gives p score
L+B. Thus, for the shift action to be successful, it has to cause all candidates in V (G) ∪E(G) to
lose a point. We claim that a successful shift bribery has to use exactly B/h = (q + (q − 1)∆) unit
shifts for every pair of voters xi, x
′
i. Why is this so? Let us fix some color i ∈ [h]. Every successful
shift action has to decrease the score of every vertex candidate and xi, x
′
i are the only votes where
p can pass the vertex candidates from V (i) without exceeding the budget. If we spend fewer than
B/h units of budget on xi, x
′
i, then there will be some vertex candidate corresponding to a vertex
from V (i) that p did not pass (and, in effect, which does not lose a point), and so p will not be a
winner. Thus we know that a successful shift action spends B/h units of budget on every pair of
voters xi, x
′
i. Further, we can assume that for each color i there is a vertex v
(i)
si ∈ V
(i) such that
in xi candidate p is shifted to be right in front of v
(i)
si+1
and in x′i candidate p is shifted to be right
in front of v
(i)
si . We call such a vertex v
(i)
si selected. If for a given pair of voters xi, x
′
i neither of the
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vertices from V (i) were selected, then there would be some vertex candidate in V (i) that p does not
pass. If for some pair of voters xi, x
′
i vertex v
(i)
si is selected, then in this pair of votes p does not pass
the edge candidates from E(v
(i)
si ). However, this means that in a successful shift action the selected
vertices form an independent set of G. If two vertices v
(i)
si and v
(j)
sj were selected, i 6= j, and if there
were an edge e connecting them, then p would not pass the candidate e in either of the pairs of votes
xi, x
′
i or xj , x
′
j . Since these are the only votes where p can pass e without exceeding the budget, in
this case e would have L+B + 1 points, while p would have L+B points and would lose.
In effect, we have the following corollary (we discuss other Borda-based rules later).
Corollary 1. Parameterized by the number of voters, k-Borda-SHIFT BRIBERY isW[1]-hard.
Corollary 1 shows that the FPT approximation scheme from Proposition 1 can presumably not
be replaced by an FPT algorithm. By Proposition 2, we also know that k-Borda-SHIFT BRIBERY
is in FPT for all-or-nothing prices and the parameterization by the number of voters.
The next result is, perhaps, even more surprising than Theorem 2. It turns out that k-Borda-
SHIFT BRIBERY is W[1]-hard also for the parameterization by the number of unit shifts, whereas
Borda-SHIFT BRIBERY is in FPT for this parameterization. To this end, we describe a parameter-
ized reduction from CLIQUE.
Theorem 3. Parameterized by the number s of unit shifts, k-Borda SHIFT BRIBERY isW[1]-hard.
Proof. We provide a parameterized reduction from the W[1]-complete CLIQUE problem in which
we are given a graph G with V (G) = {v1, . . . , vn} and E(G) = {e1, . . . , em} and we ask whether
there is a set of h pairwise adjacent vertices in G.
Given an instance of the CLIQUE problem, create an instance of k-Borda SHIFT BRIBERY as
follows. Set the budget B :=
(
h
2
)
·(2+h3), use unit price functions, and set the size of the committee
k := n− h+ 1. The candidate set is:
C = {p} ∪ V (G) ∪D(G) ∪ F,
where the sets D(G) and F contain dummy candidates specified as follows. For each edge e from
the graph, let D(e) be a set of h3 dummy candidates, and let H be a set of B dummy candidates.
Set D(G) :=
(⋃
e∈E(G)D(e)
)
∪H . Define F to contain B + (h− 1) dummy candidates.
We form the set of voters as follows:
1. For each edge e = {u, v} from G we introduce voter xe with preference order:
u ≻ v ≻ D(e) ≻ p ≻ D(G) \D(e) ≻ V (G) \ {u, v} ≻ F,
and voter ye whose preference order is the reverse of that of xe, with candidates from F
shifted to the bottom positions.
2. We introduce two voters, z and z′, where z has preference order V (G) ≻ F ≻ p ≻ D(G)
and z′ has preference order F ≻ p ≻
←−−−
V (G) ≻ D(G).
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All vertex candidates have the same score in this election, and we denote it by L. Candidate p
has score L− (h− 1)−B, and all remaining candidates have score lower than L (note that we can
assume that G has more than
(
h
2
)
edges as otherwise it certainly does not contain a size-h clique).
Intuitively, shifting p to the top positions in votes xe corresponding to a size-h clique is the only
way to ensure p’s victory
It remains to be shown the correctness of the construction. More precisely, we show that G
contains a clique of size h if and only if there is a successful shift action for our instance of k-
Borda-SHIFT BRIBERY.
For the “if” case, assume that there is a clique if size h in G. Then, a successful bribery can
shift p to the front of all xe voters corresponding to the edges inside this clique. This gives p addi-
tional B points and causes each vertex from the clique to lose h−1 points. In effect, there are n−h
vertex candidates with score higher than that of p, and h vertex candidates with the same score as p.
Since all other candidates already had lower scores, p belongs to at least one winning committee.
For the “only if” case, note that p can join some winning committee only if at least h vertex
candidates lose h− 1 points each. Without exceeding the budget, p can pass vertex candidates only
in xe votes. Through simple arithmetic, we see that within a given budget we can shift p to pass
some vertex candidates in at most
(
h
2
)
of these votes and, so, in each of them we can shift p to the
top position. That is, a successful shift action passes vertices corresponding to
(
h
2
)
edges. This can
lead to h vertex candidates losing at least h − 1 points each (or, in fact, exactly h − 1 points each)
only if these edges form a size-h clique.
6 Chamberlin-Courant and Its Variants
We now move on to the Chamberlin-Courant (CC) rules and their approximate variants. These rules
try to find a committee such that every voter is represented well by some member of the commit-
tee. Recall that WINNER DETERMINATION for Borda-CC and Approval-CC is NP-hard but can be
solved efficiently for the approximate variants. To some extent, this difference in the computational
complexity is also reflected by our findings for SHIFT BRIBERY.
Note that many results for the CC-based rules (see also Table 1 in Section 4) follow from our
results from previous sections. For the parameterizations by the number of candidates, Theorem 1
gives FPT results for all CC-based rules. For the parameterization by the number of voters, by
Proposition 3 we have FPT results for Approval-CC, Greedy-Approval-CC, and PTAS-CC. We
inheritW[1]-hardness for Borda-CC and Greedy-Borda-CC from Theorem 2, since both rules coin-
cide with the single-winner Borda rule in the case of committee size k = 1.
Corollary 2. SHIFT BRIBERY parameterized by the number of voters is W[1]-hard for Borda-CC
and for Greedy-Borda-CC even for unit price functions.
By Proposition 1, we have that there is an FPT approximation scheme for Borda-CC. How-
ever, since Proposition 1 strongly relies on candidate monotonicity of the rule, it does not apply
to Greedy-Borda-CC. Indeed, we conjecture that there is no constant-factor FPT approximation
algorithm for Greedy-Borda-CC-SHIFT BRIBERY (parameterized by the number of voters). So far
we could prove this only for the case of weighted elections, i.e., for the case where each voter v
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has an integer weight wv and counts as wv separate voters for computing the result of the election
(but not for the computation of the parameter). On the one hand, one could say that using weighted
votes goes against the spirit of parameterization by the number of voters and, to some extent, we
agree. On the other hand, however, all our FPT results for parameterization by the number of voters
(including the FPT approximation scheme in Proposition 1) do hold for the weighted case. By a
parameterized reduction from the MULTICOLORED CLIQUE problem, we obtain the following.
Theorem 4. Unless W[1] = FPT, Greedy-Borda-CC-SHIFT BRIBERY with weighted votes is not
α-approximable for any constant α, even in FPT time with respect to the number of voters and even
for unit price functions.
Proof. We first prove W[1]-hardness of the problem and then argue that this proof implies the
claimed inapproximability result.
We give a reduction from the MULTICOLORED CLIQUE problem for the case of regular graphs,
which is W[1]-complete for the parameter solution size h (see, e.g., the work of Mathieson and
Szeider [39, Lemma 3.2]). To this end, let G = (V (G), E(G)) be our input graph and let h be the
size of the desired clique (and the number of vertex colors). We use the following notation. For each
color i ∈ [h], we let V (i) = {v
(i)
1 , . . . , v
(i)
n } be the set of vertices from G with color i. For each
vertex v ∈ V (G), we write E(v) to denote the set of edges incident to v. Since G is regular, we
let d be the common degree of all the vertices (i.e., for each vertex v, |E(v)| = d). For each pair
of distinct colors i, j ∈ [h], i < j, we write E(i, j) to denote the set of edges between vertices of
color i and vertices of color j.
We make the following observation regarding Greedy-Borda-CC. In each iteration it picks a
candidate with the highest score, where this score is computed as follows: Let W be the set of
candidates already selected by Greedy-Borda-CC at this point. Consider candidate c and voter v,
and let d be the candidate from W that v ranks highest. Voter v gives max(0,posv(d) − posv(c))
points to c (i.e., the number of points by which adding c to W would increase the score of v’s
representative). The score of a candidate in a given iteration is the sum of the scores it receives from
all voters. We form an instance of Greedy-Borda-CC-SHIFT BRIBERY as follows.
The candidates. We let the candidate set be C = {b, p, p′}∪V (G)∪E(G)∪D, where p is the
preferred candidate, p′ is p’s direct competitor in the sense that either p or p′ will be in the committee,
b is the “bar” candidate (see explanation below), and D is a set of dummy candidates. Throughout
the construction we will introduce many dummy candidates and we do not give them special names;
at the end of the construction it will be clear that we add only polynomially many of them. We will
ensure that b, the bar candidate, is always chosen first into the committee, so—in essence—the
scores of all other candidates can be computed relative to b. Thus, when we describe a preference
order, we list only top parts of the voters’ preference orders, until candidate b. Candidate p is ranked
last in every vote in which we do not explicitly require something else.
We also use the following notation in the descriptions of the preference orders. For a number L,
by writing [L] in a preference order we mean introducing L new dummy candidates that are put in
the following positions in this preference order, but that in every other preference order are ranked
below b (and, thus, after b is selected receive no points from these voters).
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The voters. We introduce the following voters, whereN , Tv, Te, and Tp are four large numbers
such that N is much bigger than Tv, Tv is much bigger than Te, and Te is much bigger than Tp; we
will provide their exact values later. Each voter has weight one unless specified otherwise.
1. For each color i ∈ [h], we introduce two vertex-score voters with the following preference
orders:
V (i) ≻ [N · (Tv − i)] ≻ b,
←−−
V (i) ≻ [N · (Tv − i)] ≻ b,
and two vertex-selection voters with the following preference orders:
V (i) ≻ p ≻ b,
←−−
V (i) ≻ p ≻ b.
2. For each pair of distinct colors i, j ∈ [h], i < j, we introduce two edge-score voters with the
following preference orders:
E(i, j) ≻ [N · (Te − (i · h+ j))] ≻ b,
←−−−−
E(i, j) ≻ [N · (Te − (i · h+ j))] ≻ b,
and two edge-selection voters with the following preference orders:
E(i, j) ≻ p ≻ b,
←−−−−
E(i, j) ≻ p ≻ b.
Each of the edge-selection voters has weight ω = 8n(d + 1) (and these are the only voters
with non-unit weights).
3. For each color i ∈ [h] we introduce two verification voters with the following preference
orders:
p ≻ v
(i)
1 ≻ E(v
(i)
1 ) ≻ · · · ≻ v
(i)
n ≻ E(v
(i)
n ) ≻ b,
p ≻ v(i)n ≻
←−−−−
E(v(i)n ) ≻ · · · ≻ v
(i)
1 ≻
←−−−−
E(v
(i)
1 ) ≻ b.
4. We introduce the following two voters, the p/p′-score voters, with the following preference
orders:
p′ ≻ [N · Tp − h(n+ 1)(d + 1)] ≻ b,
p ≻ [N · Tp − 2h(nd+ n+ 1)] ≻ b.
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5. Let H be the total weight of voters introduced so far (clearly, H is polynomially upper-
bounded in the input size of the MULTICOLORED CLIQUE instance (G,h)). We introduce
2H +1 pairs of voters with preference orders b ≻ C \{b} and b ≻
←−−−−
C \ {b}. We refer to these
voters as the bar-score voters.
We assume that the internal tie-breaking prefers p to p′—we could modify the construction
slightly if it were the other way round.
Committee size and budget. We set the committee size to be k = 1+h+
(
h
2
)
+1. We use unit
prices for the voters and we set the budget B = |V | − h+ |E| −
(
h
2
)
.
We claim that for an appropriate choice ofN , Tv, Te, and Tp it is possible to ensure that p is in a
winning committee if and only if there is multicolored size-h clique for G. We now argue why this
is the case.
The idea. The general idea is to show that every shift action (even the zero-vector, that means
not bribing the voters) of costs at most B leads to a committee that contains:
1. the bar candidate b,
2. for each color i, one candidate corresponding to a vertex of color i,
3. for each color pair {i, j}, i 6= j one candidate corresponding to an edge incident to a vertex
of color i and to a vertex of color j, and
4. candidate p if the selected vertices and edges encode a multicolored clique; otherwise the
committee contains p′.
Furthermore, any such combination of vertices and edges can be selected within the given budget,
that is, there is a successful shift action if a multicolored clique of size h exists.
Correctness. Observe that due to the bar-score voters, irrespective how we shift p within the
budget, Greedy-Borda-CC will first choose b. Thus, from this point on, we compute the score of all
candidates relative to b (and, in later rounds, the other selected members of the committee, but there
is a limited number of such interactions).
We now describe the next h+
(
h
2
)
+ 1 rounds, for each of them first describing the situation as
if p were not shifted and then indicating how the iteration would change with appropriate shifts.
After the first iteration, when b is selected, for each color i ∈ [h], every vertex in V (i) has score:
(2N · (Tv − i) + (n+ 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
vertex-score voters
+ (n+ 3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vertex-selection voters
+((n+ 1)(d + 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
verification voters
.
The points in the first bracket come from the vertex-score voters, in the second bracket from the
vertex-selection voters, and in the last bracket from the verification voters. Further, since Tv is much
larger than Te and Tp, every non-vertex candidate has significantly lower score.
Thus, in the next h rounds, for each color i ∈ [h], Greedy-Borda-CC adds into the committee
one vertex candidate of color i. Note that as soon as it picks some vertex candidate of color i, the
scores of all other vertex candidates of this color immediately drop by at least 2N · (Tv − i) and, so,
their scores are much too low to be selected in the following rounds.
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By shifting candidate p in the vertex-selection votes, for each color i ∈ [h] and each vertex
in V (i) it is possible to ensure that exactly this vertex is selected (it suffices to ensure that every
other vertex candidate of this color loses one point due to p passing him or her). The costs of such
shifts are at most |V |−h in total. In other words, we can assume that after these h iterations Greedy-
Borda-CC picks one vertex candidate of each color, and that by shift action of cost at most |V | − h
it is possible to choose precisely which ones.
In the next
(
h
2
)
iterations, Greedy-Borda-CC picks one edge candidate for each pair of colors.
Not counting the verification voters, for each pair of colors i, j ∈ [h], i < j, every edge candidate
connecting vertices of colors i and j has score:
(N(Te − (i · h+ j)) + |E(i, j)| + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
edge-score voters
+(ω(|E(i, j)| + 3))︸ ︷︷ ︸
edge-selection voters
,
where the points from the first bracket come from the edge-score voters and the points in the second
bracket come from the edge-selection voters. Further, every such candidate receives less than ω2
points from the verification voters.
Since Te is much larger than Tp, and since by shifting p forward in the votes of edge-selection
voters it is possible to remove ω points from the scores of all but one edge candidate in each E(i, j),
it is possible to precisely select for each E(i, j) which of its members is added to the committee
with a shift action of total cost |E| −
(
h
2
)
. Analogously to the case of vertices, whenever some
candidate from E(i, j) is selected, the other ones lose so many points that they have no chance of
being selected in any of the following iterations.
In the final iteration, the algorithm either selects p′ or p. Candidate p′ has score N · Tp −
h(n + 1)(d + 1), whereas the score of p depends on the vertex and the edge candidates that were
so far introduced into the committee. If we disregarded all committee members selected after b,
then p would have score N · Tp, because p receives N · Tp − 2h(nd + n + 1) points from the
p/p′-score voters and 2(nd + n + 1) points for every color i ∈ [h] from the verification voters.
However, if we take into account the candidates selected in the preceding rounds, then, for each
color i ∈ [h], p loses (n+1)(d+1) points from the verification voters. This is true since whenever
some candidate from V (i) is in the committee, we compute p’s score relative to this vertex candidate
and not relative to b. If these were the only points that p lost due to the committee members already
selected, then—by tie-breaking—p would win against p′. However, if for some pair of colors i, j ∈
[h], i < j, the committee contained some edge e that connected vertices that are not both in the
committee, then p would lose at least one more point from the verification voters (either for color i
or for color j or for both) because at least one of these verification voters would rank e ahead
of all the vertex candidates from the committee. Then p′ would be selected. This means that p
ends up in the committee if and only if due to an appropriate shift action we select vertices and
edges corresponding to a multicolored clique. This proves the correctness of the reduction for an
appropriate choice of N , Tv, Te, and Tp, which is discussed next.
The values ofN , Tv, Te, and Tp. While one could pick tight precise values, for the correctness
of the proof it suffices to take, say, Tp = (
(
h
2
)
· |V | · |E|)3, Te = T
3
p , Tv = T
3
e , and N = T
3
v .
Finally, we discuss the inapproximability result that is implied by our reduction.
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Inapproximability. Observe that, in fact, the above proof gives our inapproximability result.
The reason is that for a given constant factor α, we could increase N by the same factor and it
would be impossible for p to pass the bar candidate in any of the votes, even if we were to spend
α times the necessary budget. In effect, for p to succeed we would still have to find a multicolored
clique.
For the parameterization by the number of unit shifts, both Borda-CC and Approval-CC are
para-NP-hard due to the hardness of WINNER DETERMINATION.5 For Greedy-Approval-CC, PTAS-
CC, and Greedy-Borda-CC we obtain W[2]-hardness results and inapproximability results.
Theorem 5. Parameterized by the total number s of unit shifts, SHIFT BRIBERY isW[2]-hard even
in case of unit prices for Greedy-Borda-CC, Greedy-Approval-CC, and PTAS-CC. Further, unless
W[2] = FPT, in these cases the problem is not α-approximable for any constant α.
Proof. First, we show the result for Greedy-Approval-CC for t-Approval satisfaction function with
t ≥ 3 (which implies the same result for PTAS-CC). Second, we show how the proof idea can be
adapted to obtain the same result for Greedy-Borda-CC.
Greedy-Approval-CC. We reduce from the SET COVER problem, which is W[2]-hard parameter-
ized by the set cover size h. Given a set U of elements, a family S of subsets of U , and an integer h,
SET COVER asks whether there is a subset of h sets from S whose union is U . Let (S, U, h) be an
instance of SET COVER, where S = (S1, . . . , Ss) is a collection of sets, U = {u1, . . . , ur} is the
universe, and h is the solution size. We construct a Greedy-Approval-CC SHIFT BRIBERY instance
as follows.
Important candidates. For each element u ∈ U , we introduce two element candidates, c−(u)
and c+(u). Analogously, for each set S ∈ S , we introduce two set candidates, c−(S) and c+(S).
Furthermore, we introduce the preferred candidate p and a candidate p′.
Dummy candidates. For each voter (to be specified later), we introduce up to (t − 1) dummy
candidates. Each dummy candidate is approved by exactly one voter, for whom he or she is intro-
duced. All the important candidates will have much higher scores than the dummy ones and, so,
no dummy candidate will join the winning committee, irrespective of the shifts of the preferred
candidate. The reason for introducing the dummy candidates is to ensure that even though we use
t-Approval scores, we can construct each voter so that he or she approves any number t′, 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t,
of important candidates (and the remaining t−t′ top positions are filled with the dummy candidates).
Committee size and budget. We set the budget equal to the size h of the set cover and the
committee size to |S|+ |U |+ 1.
The idea. The idea of the reduction is to construct an election where the Greedy-Approval-CC
rule first simulates the process of choosing the sets from the SET COVER instance and then chooses
the elements from the universe that are covered.
5The literature [37, 46] speaks of hardness of computing the score of a winning committee, but one can show that
deciding whether a given candidate is in some winning committee is NP-hard as well (and, indeed, this was formally
shown by Bredereck et al. [13]).
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We will form the preference orders of the voters so that, prior to shifting the preferred candidate,
in the first s iterations Greedy-Approval-CC would choose candidates c−(S1), . . . , c
−(Ss), in the
next r iterations it would choose candidate c−(u1), . . . , c
−(ur), and finally it would choose p
′.
However, for each set Si ∈ S , we can shift p by one position in one vote so that instead of selecting
c−(Si), Greedy-Approval-CC will choose c
+(Si) in the appropriate round (we call such set Si
selected). Then, for each element u, if there is a selected set that contains u, then Greedy-Approval-
CC will select c+(u) instead of c−(u) in the appropriate round. In the end, if we select h sets that
cover all elements from the universe, Greedy-Approval-CC will choose p instead of p′. Intuitively,
candidates c−(S) correspond to sets S that are not included in the SET COVER solution, candidates
c+(S) correspond to the sets that are used in the solution, candidates c−(u) correspond to elements
that are not covered, and candidates c+(u) correspond to the covered ones.
Specifying the voters. To specify the preference order of a voter, for our purposes it suffices
to provide the set of at most t important candidates that this voter approves (i.e., ranks on the top
t positions) and indicate if one of these candidates is ranked on the t-th position, right before p (so
that p can push this candidate out of the approved area and enter it him- or herself). All remaining
top t positions are filled with dummy voters. If p is not ranked on the t+ 1-st position, then we put
p on the last position in the preference order (so it is impossible to shift p to an approved position
within the budget). All candidates that have not been mentioned so far are ranked in some arbitrary
order, below the top t positions (or below the top t+ 1 positions, if p is on the t+ 1-st one).
The voters. The set of voters contains |S| many S-voters, |S| · |U | many S-U -voters, and
|U | many U -voters:
1. For each set S ∈ S , there is one S-voter that approves c−(S) (and some dummy candidates),
so that with a single unit shift the preferred candidate p can push c−(S) from the approved
area and take its place.
2. For each set S ∈ S and each element u ∈ U , there is one S-u-voter that approves: (a) c+(S),
(b) c−(u) provided that u ∈ S, and (c) some dummy candidates.
3. For each element u ∈ U , there is one u-voter that approves p′ and c+(u).
There are further auxiliary voters that allow us to appropriately set the number of approvals for each
candidate:
1. For each S ∈ S , there are |S|5 · |U |5 − j voters that approve c−(S) and c+(S) (and some
dummy candidates).
2. For each S ∈ S , there are additional |U | − 1 voters that approve c−(S) (and some dummy
candidates).
3. For each u ∈ U , there are |S|4 · |U |4 − i voters that approve c−(u) and c+(u) (and some
dummy candidates).
4. For each u ∈ U , there are additional |{S ∈ S | u ∈ S}| − 1 voters that only approve c+(u)
(and some dummy candidates).
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5. There are |S|2 · |U |2 voters that approve p and p′ (and some dummy candidates).
6. There are h− 1 additional voters that only approve p′ (and some dummy candidates).
By our convention, all but the set voters rank p on the last position and, thus, it is too expensive to
bribe them to shift p to an approved position.
The construction can be computed in polynomial time. Our parameter, the number of unit shifts,
is upper-bounded by the budget, which is identical to the set cover size h. Before we prove the
correctness of the reduction, let us briefly discuss the properties of the election prior to shifting p.
Scores, ties, and the unbribed election. First, consider the scores of the candidates in the very
first round of the voting rule, listed below:
1. For each set S ∈ S , both candidate c−(S) and candidate c+(S) have |S|5 · |U |5 − j + |U |
approvals.
2. For each element u ∈ U , both candidate c−(ui) and candidate c
+(ui) have |S|
4 · |U |4 − i+
|{S ∈ S | ui ∈ S}| approvals.
3. Candidate p′ has |S|2 · |U |2 + |U |+ h− 1 approvals.
4. Candidate p has |S|2 · |U |2 approvals.
We set the tie-breaking order of Greedy-Approval-CC so that candidate p′ is preferred to candidate p
and for each x ∈ U ∪ S , candidate c−(x) is preferred to candidate c+(x).6
One can verify that in the unbribed election the candidates will join the committee in the follow-
ing order: c−(S1), c
−(S2), . . . , c
−(Ss), c
−(u1), c
−(u2), . . . , c
−(ur), and finally p
′. To see this, note
that for each x ∈ U ∪ S , each pair of candidates c−(x) and c+(x) is approved by almost the same
sets of voters. As soon as one of c−(x) and c+(x) joins the committee, the other loses nearly all
approvals and has no chance of joining the committee. Furthermore, the candidates corresponding
to the sets have higher numbers of approvals than those corresponding to the elements, and within
both groups the numbers of approvals decrease as the indices of the respective sets and elements
increase. Finally, tie-breaking ensures that the Greedy-Approval-CC chooses the c− candidates.
Candidate scores. In the following text, we will often speak of the scores of the candidates.
For a given round (always clear from the context), the score of a candidate is the number of voters
that approve this candidate and do not approve any candidate already included in the committee in
the preceding rounds.
The impact of shifting p. The only shift actions that affect the result of the election and that
are within the given budget regard up to B = h set voters. Let c−(Sj1), . . . , c
−(Sjh) be the can-
didates that were originally approved by the bribed set voters instead of approving p. We call
S∗ := {Sj1 , Sj2 , . . . , Sjh} the selected sets. Applying the corresponding shift actions will decrease
the score of each candidate c−(Sjℓ), 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ h, by one and increase the score of p by h. One
can verify that, in effect, for each 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ h, Greedy-Approval-CC will select c+(Sjℓ) instead
of c−(Sjℓ) to join the committee in the respective round. Now, observe that for each u ∈ Sjℓ ,
6The reduction can be adapted to work for any given tie-breaking.
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there is one voter that approves c+(Sjℓ) and c
−(u). This means that the score of each c−(u) for
u ∈
⋃
S∈S∗ S is decreased by at least one after the first |S| candidates joined the committee. Hence,
if c+(Sjℓ) joins the committee instead of c
−(Sjℓ), then also c
+(u) joins instead of c−(u). Finally,
observe that, after s+ r candidates joined the committee, the score of p′ is decreased by the number
of candidates c+(u) that joined the committee instead of c−(u) (this is due to the U -voters).
Correctness. We show that there is a subset of h sets from S whose union is U if and only
if there is a successful set of shift actions of cost h. For the “if” case, assume that there is a set
S ′ ⊆ S of h sets whose union is U . Then, bribing the S-voter for each S ∈ S ′ to approve p instead
of c−(S) costs h and successfully makes p a winner: From the above discussion about the impact of
shift actions, we immediately conclude that after the first s + r rounds, the committee contains all
the c+(u) candidates, so the score of p′ is |S|2 · |U |2 + h− 1, and the score of p is |S|2 · |U |2 + h.
Thus, in the final round, p is included in the committee instead of p′.
For the “only if” case, assume that there is a shift action with cost h that makes p join the
committee. Since p can gain at most h points, p′ has to lose at least |U | points (for the final round).
However, the only (important) candidates that are approved together with p′ by some voters are the
element candidates c+(u). To decrease the score of p′ by |U |, all the c+(u) candidates must join
the committee instead of the c−(u) candidates. From the above discussion about the impact of shift
actions, this is possible only if the union of the selected sets is U .
Inapproximability. With a slight modification of the above construction, we obtain (fixed-
parameter) inapproximability. Let α > 1 be the considered approximation ratio. First, note that
even within a budget of α · B one can only afford to bribe the set voters, because in all other voters
p is ranked last (if there are fewer than α · B candidates between the last position in a vote and
the t-th one, then we add sufficiently many never-approved dummy candidates). Second, introduce
another pair of important candidates, d and d′, and let the set voters additionally approve d. Next,
introduce:
1. |S|3 · |U |3 voters that approve d and d′ (and some dummy candidates),
2. |S| − h voters that only approve d′ (and some dummy candidates),
3. |S| · |U | voters that approve p′ and d (and some dummy candidates), and further
4. |S| · |U | voters that only approve d′ (and some dummy candidates).
Finally, set the tie-breaking so that d is preferred to d′ and increase the committee size by one.
The first |S| + |U | rounds of the Greedy-Approval-CC procedure proceed as in the original
construction. As long as at most h set voters are bribed, candidate d will join the committee in
round |S|+ |U |+ 1. In consequence, candidate d′ loses almost all points and has no chance to join
the committee, and candidate p′ loses all additional approvals (introduced by the |S| · |U | new voters
that approve both p′ and d). That is, the last round proceeds as in the original construction. However,
if one bribes more than h set voters, then candidate d′ will join the committee in round |S|+ |U |+1,
p′ keeps the additionally introduced approvals, and p has no chance to join the committee in the last
round.
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It follows that, even with a budget of α ·B, one can only make p become member of a winning
committee if one selects a subset of at most h sets from S whose union is U .
Greedy-Borda-CC. For the case of Greedy-Borda-CC we also give a reduction from the SET
COVER problem. The basic idea of the construction is very similar to that in the proof for Greedy-
Approval-CC. However, to implement this idea, we also use some concepts from the proof of
Theorem 4. To this and, we use the same notational conventions as in the proof of Theorem 4,
and we use the bar candidate in the same way.
Given an instance (S, U, h) of SET COVER with S = (S1, . . . , Ss) denoting the given sets over
the universe U = {u1, . . . , ur}, we construct a Greedy-Borda-CC SHIFT BRIBERY instance as
follows.
We form the following set of candidates:
1. We introduce the preferred candidate p, his or her opponent p′, and the bar candidate b.
2. For each set Si ∈ S , we introduce two candidates c
−(Si) and c
+(Si).
3. For each element uj ∈ U , we introduce candidates c
−(uj) and c
+(uj).
4. We introduce sufficiently many dummy candidates.
Let N , Ts, Tu, and Tp be some sufficiently large numbers such that N is much larger than Ts,
Ts is much larger than Tu, and Tu is much larger than Tp (we will specify their values later). We
introduce the following voters:
1. For each set Si ∈ S , we introduce two set-score voters with preference orders:
c−(Si) ≻ c
+(Si) ≻ [N · (Ts − i)] ≻ b,
c+(Si) ≻ c
−(Si) ≻ [N · (Ts − i)] ≻ b.
Further, for each set we introduce two set-selection voters with preference orders:
c−(Si) ≻ p ≻ b,
c+(Si) ≻ [1] ≻ b.
2. For each element uj ∈ U , we introduce two element-score voters with preference orders:
c−(uj) ≻ c
+(uj) ≻ [N · (Tu − j)] ≻ b,
c+(uj) ≻ c
−(uj) ≻ [N · (Tu − j)] ≻ b.
3. For each uj ∈ U , we introduce a verification voter c
+(uj) ≻ p
′ ≻ b.
4. For each element uj ∈ U , and each set Si ∈ S such that uj ∈ Si, we introduce a covering
voter with preference order:
c+(Si) ≻ c
−(uj) ≻ b.
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Further, for each candidate c ∈ U ∪ {c−(S1), c
+(S1), . . . , c
−(Ss), c
+(Ss)}, we introduce
exactly so many filler voters with preference orders of the form c ≻ b so that, relative to b,
all these candidates receive the same score from the verification, covering, and filler voters
(taken together).
5. We introduce two p/p′-score voters with preference orders p′ ≻ [N · (Tp) + 2h] ≻ b and
p ≻ [N · (Tp)] ≻ b.
6. Let H be the number of voters introduced so far (clearly, H is polynomially upper-bounded
in the size of the input instance). We introduce 2H + 1 pairs of voters with preference orders
b ≻ C \ {b} and b ≻
←−−−−
C \ {b}. We refer to these voters as the bar-score voters.
We set the committee size to be 1 + s + r + 1, and we set the budget B = h. We use unit
price functions. The internal tie-breaking is such that p precedes p′, for each Si ∈ S , c
−(Si) pre-
cedes c+(Si), and for each uj ∈ U , c
−(uj) precedes c
+(uj).
The correctness proof is analogous to that for Greedy-Approval-CC. To see this, let us now ana-
lyze how Greedy-Borda-CC proceeds on the just-constructed election. As in the proof of Theorem 4,
it is clear that in the first iteration it picks b. Due to the values of N and Ts, in the next s iterations,
for each Si ∈ S , Greedy-Borda-CC either adds c
−(Si) to the committee or it adds c
+(Si) to the
committee. With a shift action of cost h—by shifting p forward in the votes of the set-selection
voters—we can select which h of the c+(Si) candidates are introduced into the committee (indeed,
we need to introduce h of them to increase p’s score—in the final iteration—by h).
In the next r iterations, for each j Greedy-Borda-CC picks either c−(uj) or c
+(uj). One can
verify that it picks exactly those c+(uj) candidates for which in the preceding iterations it has picked
at least one candidate c+(Si) such that uj ∈ Si (due to the covering voters).
In the final iteration, Greedy-Borda-CC either picks p or p′. It picks the former one exactly if
it managed to pick h candidates from S ′ := {c+(Sj1), . . . , c
+(Sjh)} and all candidates c
+(uj)
(since then p′ loses |U | points from the verification voters and has score N · Tp + 1 + 2h, p has
the same score, as it gets 2h points from the set selection voters, and tie-breaking prefers p to p′).
This happens if and only if we applied a shift action that ensured selection of those h of the c+(Si)
candidates that correspond to a set cover, that is,
⋃
S∈S′ S = U .
To complete the proof for the Greedy-Borda-CC case, we need to pick the values of N , Ts, Tu,
and Tp. It is easy to see that the values Tp = (r · s · h)
3, Tu = T
3
p , Ts = T
3
u , and N = T
3
s suffice.
This provesW[2]-hardness of SHIFT-BRIBERY for Greedy-Borda-CC. To see the inapproxima-
bility result, one can use an extension to the construction that works analogously to the extension in
the proof for Greedy-Approval-CC.
7 Conclusion
We studied the complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY for two families of multiwinner rules: one, repre-
sented by SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda, in which rules pick k best candidates according to appropriate
single-winner scoring rules, and another of Chamberlin-Courant rules and their approximate vari-
ants, which focus on providing good representatives. While we have shown low complexity for
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SNTV and Bloc (just like for the single-winner rules on which they are based), we have shown
that SHIFT BRIBERY is significantly harder to solve for k-Borda than for its single-winner variant,
Borda. The situation is even more dramatic for the Chamberlin-Courant family of rules, where in
addition toW[1]- andW[2]-hardness results, we also obtain inapproximability results.
We focused on the case where we want to ensure a candidate’s membership in some winning
committee, but it would also be natural to require membership in all winning committees. In fact, all
our results hold in this model as well, via simple tweaks (and, in particular, the results for Greedy-
Borda-CC, Greedy-Approval-CC, and PTAS-CC already are in this setting because these rules al-
ways produce a single committee).
Putting an even more demanding bribery goal of involving more than one candidate to become
part of the winning committee(s) is left for future studies. Areas of future research also include
studying bribery problems for multiwinner settings with partial preference orders and studying mul-
tiwinner rules based on the Condorcet criterion (for the hardness of winner determination in such
rules, see the works of Sekar et al. [48] and Aziz et al. [3]). Furthermore, our FPT algorithms with
respect to the parameter number of candidates rely on integer linear programming formulations.
It seems challenging to replace these algorithms by direct combinatorial algorithms that give us
a better understanding of the problems and potentially better running times. This reflects a gen-
eral challenge in the context of parameterized algorithms for Computation Social Choice [7, Key
question 1].
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